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Law as a global entity through Italian eyes and minds
Werner Menski
Law, SOAS University of London, London, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT
This contribution discusses, from the perspective of global com-
parative law, how Mariano Croce’s English translation of a major
book by an important early-Italian scholar, Santi Romano, allows
helpful insights into early twentieth-century Italian thinking about
the intrinsically plural nature of law. This debate connects directly
to current worldwide discourses about legal pluralism, showing
how Romano’s exciting project forms an early precursor of the
gradual movement towards obtaining a better grasp of the inner
nature of the deeply plural concept of law. Romano’s work, as a
remarkably pertinent early contribution, of lasting relevance to
global legal theorizing, indicates that a reductionist, positivistic
conceptualization of law that ignores the legal agency of common
citizens could easily lead to disastrous outcomes through abuses
of state-centric powers. Connecting Romano’s early theorizing to
many currently ongoing debates in diﬀerent jurisdictions and legal
orders about the plurality of laws, this article seeks to demonstrate
the powerful impact that such kind of pioneering work can have
even today. It strengthens, above all, the currently growing reali-
zation that law is certainly much more than state law, and that
people’s laws and their diverse values and ethics should be treated
with more respect by legal orders.
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Introduction
A century ago, the Italian scholar Santi Romano (21 January 1875–3 November
1947) thought innovatively about the concept of law, the state and the relationship
of law and society. Romano’s The Legal Order made an epistemic intervention
through the ‘institutional theory of law’, the claim that various forms of institutions,
and not just positivist state law, constitute the basic building blocks of law. This
challenged state-centricity to devise better methods of securing legal protection for
diﬀerent groups of people. Mariano Croce has provided a sterling service to legal
history and legal philosophy by ﬁnally making this important work accessible in
English. This exciting project, especially when read within a global context, forms
part of the inch-by-inch movement towards obtaining a better grasp of the real
nature of the deeply plural concept of ‘law’ that legal scholars everywhere, in the
Global North as well as the Global South, still struggle to understand, let alone agree
on (see, e.g. Menski, 2006: 32; Tamanaha, 2009: 17).
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The polemic climate surrounding this issue, even in those early times, is almost
immediately identiﬁed when Romano refers to Kant’s mocking comment that ‘[j]urists
are still searching for a deﬁnition of their concept of law’ (p. 2. n. 4). Romano’s
‘institutional theory of law’ (p. 49) challenged what Griﬃths (1986: 4) much later
came to call legal centralism and Chiba (1986: 1–2), in the same year, critiqued as
‘Western model jurisprudence’. These legal scholars clearly identiﬁed the myopic
monism of positivist legal science as faulty, probably hiding its own hunger for power
by deliberately obscuring the various impacts and inputs of anthropology, sociology,
philosophy, morality and ethics in relation to law.
This article ﬁrst assesses Romano’s contribution and problematizes some of its
limitations. It then examines the deeper relevance of Santi Romano’s project, before
turning to several contested practical implications, especially regarding recognition of
various forms of ‘people’s law’ as the legal ‘other’. The strategic silence of Romano
about ethical dimensions of the law is then identiﬁed and put into the wider context of
plurality-conscious global legal theorizing. It is argued that this deliberate silence should
not be seen as dismissal of the value of ethics and morality in legal theorizing and the
practical management of welfare structures today, particularly in the massive countries
of the Global South. Romano can be read as endorsing holistic legal theorizing and this
should not be underrated in the worldwide reception of his English text that we now
fortunately have.
Romano’s contribution
A less than careful reading of Romano’s Italian-based, Eurocentric theorizing in The
Legal Order risks imposing some signiﬁcant limitations on realizing the vast relevance
of his work within a wider global context. I stress this upfront, since Romano speciﬁ-
cally and deliberately kept values and ethics outside his legal analysis. This does not
mean that he dismissed ethics, values and even ‘religion’ as irrelevant for legal theoriz-
ing. It seems he was simply making a speciﬁc limited point, which is, however, of major
global relevance even today.
A trained lawyer, Romano was involved in important research projects from the start
of his professional career. Though exposed to state-centric indoctrination, he managed
to retain his own critical thinking power, Croce’s insightful ‘Afterword’ explains the
young man’s freedom of spirit by noting that ‘Romano had no penchant for the
limelight of politics’, adding that fortunately for legal scholarship, he ‘developed a
new seminal approach to the legal phenomenon’ (p. 112). This was, it seems, new for
Italy at that time, while probably the ancient Romans had their own, maybe not
radically diﬀerent, thoughts on this topic. Anyway, Romano then devoted the next
30 years of his life (1897–1928) to legal studies and teaching, until Mussolini appointed
him as President of the Council of State, Italy’s highest administrative court, a position
he held from 1929 to 1944. Despite reservations about the beneﬁt of scrutinizing
biographical details to understand an author’s theorizing, Croce admits that considera-
tion of the socio-historical setting of Romano’s life and times is inevitable. I wondered if
we have learnt enough about this.
Croce’s carefully annotated translation now oﬀers an anglocentric readership access
to a hitherto hidden gem of legal scholarship. Globally, there are many such hidden
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treasures, while we struggle in a polyphonic, multilingual world to make sense of each
other’s words and thoughts, even when expressed in familiar languages. There is much
writing and talking past each other, with valuable messages being lost in translation and
intercultural communication, but also in personal pettiness. While heuristic progress
remains painfully slow, positivist backlashes remain vocal, sometimes cloaked in ‘reli-
gious’ authority or dressed up in public interest arguments, nowadays often around
terrorism and security.
The arduous task of translation, which is well known, is particularly tricky regarding
legal concepts. Nobody could really hope to get away nowadays by insisting that ‘law’ just
means ‘law’, given the many nuances and variations in context and meaning in diﬀerent
historical, cultural and linguistic contexts. An early, simple yet thought-provoking attempt
to highlight this was the distinction of ‘LAW, Law and law’ made by Allott (1980: 2).
Recently, a sophisticated eﬀort to understand Islamic law from within is presented in a
massive study (Shahab, 2016), using sources from a variety of Islam-related languages and
cultures to produce an amazingly rich picture of Islamic institutions and actions in the wide
space between the Balkans and Bengal. After some work on ancient concepts of Hindu law
(Menski, 2003), and venturing deeper into comparative law and legal pluralism studies
(Menski, 2006), I can ﬁnd no reason to disagree with Romano’s above-cited reference to
Kant’s mocking statement, which more than a 100 years later remains completely true. But
have we obtained suﬃcient explanations why Romano, as a positivist, state-centric lawyer,
polluted the positivist nest by accepting various forms of non-state law as law? If one
possible answer is that Sicily actually belongs to the Global South, what would be the
implication for global legal theorizing? After reading this book, including Croce’s excellent
‘Afterword’, I admit having not yet understood fully why Romano’s theorizing appears to
sideline ethics and values, as this cannot be appropriate for a viable globally valid legal
theory. My own studies, relying initially primarily on Chiba (1986), and more recently on
further research with Japanese colleagues, which is only published in Japanese, suggest that
‘law’ cannot reasonably be conceptualized merely as a state-centric entity. Its basic building
blocks of rules, processes and values all have legal, social, as well as ethical components.
Romano at least identiﬁed the ﬁrst two, but kept quiet about the third element.
I noticed that Croce as translator skilfully uses the word ‘entity’ (pp. 14, 46, 123),
setting my mind ablaze with memories,1 oﬀering fresh challenges for comparative law
theorizing. Is our collective inability to unambiguously identify ‘law’ not remarkably
akin to similar troubles regarding the concept of ‘religion’? While ‘law’ is largely
dependent on certain entities and human constructs, marked by partiality and sub-
jective perspectives, including belief, ‘religion’ also involves various entities, including
gods, created by human imagination and/or action, and belief, too. Both sets of entities,
related human agencies and the resulting visions of orders, dynamically develop their
own speciﬁcs and momentum over time. Both law and religion also seem to pre-exist or
go beyond such human interventions and their direct reach. Ancient Indic traditions
sagely distinguished religious-cum-secular macrocosmic notions of Order (rta and
satya in Sanskrit) and more microcosmic concepts of order like dharma (Menski,
1Without claiming any special credit here, I point to Menski (2006: 184), where the term ‘entity’, here speciﬁcally as
creator of a body of rules, is used. It may be useful to know that Croce and I worked together at SOAS for some time,
ﬁnding that we were broadly on the same wavelength, despite access to very diﬀerent registers of legal writing.
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2003, 2006: 205–209). One does not need to be religious to perceive this; it may be plain
common sense. Whatever it is, acceptance of the existence of some kind of higher
LAW, however named, could also be treated as a secular form of religion, as found in
the ancient non-theistic minority tradition (not to say institution!) of Jainism (see now
Rankin, 2018), while belief in RELIGION will surely have various legal implications. If
readers are beginning to suspect that I am raising these points here to suggest that
maybe all these entities are somehow holistically connected and overlap, they are
completely on the right track.
Romano, however, was not centrally interested in these holistic dimensions. His
Hegelian debate explicitly mentions microcosm and macrocosm (p. 52), conﬁrming
that he does not totally deny the potential relevance of religion, ethics or morality. But
as an early modern scholar, Romano perceived that the state has taken control of the
steering wheel, allowing his well-focused analytical searchlight to fall only on ‘institu-
tions’, while avoiding the messiness of a holistic project of legal analysis that would
involve competing forms of ethics, as shown now in a four-cornered kite model of law
(Menski, 2013). Romano deliberately sidelined the inevitable connectedness of law, while
talking rather much about the highly plural relations of state law and international law.
This conﬁrms that he was peering inside the phenomenon of law, rather than scrutinizing
its deeper interdisciplinary relatedness to other entities. Hence, although Romano com-
ments eﬀectively on the relatedness of law, not its separation, his socio-legal analysis
remains too speciﬁc and narrow, inevitably fails to produce an outcome recognizable as
global legal theorizing. Though he challenges monist legal positivism and his focus
remains partly state-centric, overall, this approach is not just pertinent for Italians in
his time. It also forms, almost by default, a hugely important foundation for wider,
globally valid legal theorizing. Here is a sharp legal mind at work, placed in a particular
time and space, deeply concerned that the basic object of his study remains so messily
contested, and yet Romano decided to tackle only one small aspect of the whole scenario.
One could see a positivist or monist project here, seeking to improve certainty in the
application of the law. Probably, though, that was not his main aim.
My observations about this brilliant yet limited project of an administrative lawyer in
early twentieth-century Italy are thus twofold. First, this is a consciously secular analysis
of law, which deliberately elides the presence and power of religion and the role of
ethics and morality. This reﬂects the secular, modernist spirit of the time, probably still
suﬀering from theocratic phobias, indeed physically quite close to the Vatican, arguably
the most potent seat of religious power ever. Given that this feared legal ‘other’ is right
in front of one’s eyes and mind, while one seeks to understand the nature and power of
law, any Italian theorist of law must be forgiven for this stance. There is no need for
penitence here, mea culpa lamentations, or any payment to atone for sins of omission.
Secondly, this secular analysis of law is also completely Eurocentric. Its geographical
reach ends basically at the Bosporus, which is problematic (Menski, 1997). Thus, closely
related to the ﬁrst observation, I argue that Romano’s approach constitutes merely a
strongly partial, also geographically restrained analysis, which seems to give it limited
relevance for a sustainable and credibly global theory of law today. Today we know, for
example, through the Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History (Katz, 2009),
which took a truly global team 10 years to produce, that there is much more to consider
than common law and civil law, and a few other minor members of an extended family.
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The deeper relevance of Romano’s project
The above comments, however, do not mean that Romano’s book is useless, or his
theory is defective or redundant. By insisting that the key term ‘institution’ is internally
plural and does not merely comprise various state-made institutions, the epistemic
breakthrough and hallmark of Romano’s theorizing is pinpointed as explicit recognition
of the socio-legal sphere. This domain is not just capable of having legal eﬀects; it
becomes an alternative form of law. Europeans should not be surprised, for even today,
virtually the entire Global South remains familiar with the concept of so-called personal
law systems, which evidently treat social institutions as a form of law. Romano observed
in his time that of all kinds of institutions made by people as social actors exist in lived
experience. There was no question for him about whether custom is law! For an Italian,
this may be a daring step, as positivist opposition will wait at every corner to assail such
heresy. However, Romano seems to be a ﬁne early embodiment of a phrase I have
begun to use more often recently, namely that a good monist is of necessity a pluralist.2
Notably, Lorenzo Zucca (2018) has recently suggested that plurality-conscious legal
positivism should seek to avoid the emergence of a ‘black market’ in the law.
Despite Croce’s reservations about the relevance of biographical details, I sense further
that Romano’s locatedness as a Sicilian enabled him, in a somewhat subversive way, to
take a perspective not untypical of non-majoritarian Italians. The constitutional history
of Italy as a composite nation is well known and need not be explained here. People living
in a locality far from the centre of national power, whether ancient Rome or its more
recent position as the Italian Republic’s capital, will beneﬁt from being equipped with
locally coloured lenses. Working with many Italian scholars over the years, I have learnt a
lot about diﬀerent local perspectives, which impact on attitudes to law.3
Local claims to freedom to be diﬀerent, whether in a federal sense or simply in terms
that would come close to Ehrlich’s notion of ‘living law’, are thus clearly reﬂected in
Romano’s theorizing. He refers to the lived experience of the law, but nowhere calls this
‘living law’, for obvious reasons. His sophisticated terminology of ‘institution’ indicates
full awareness of the power, agency and discretion of local social actors, claiming
recognition as legal agents. His points of diﬀerence with Ehrlich’s theory seem minor.
More important is the realization that claims for recognition by social institutions for
oﬃcial legal recognition would create conﬂicts. These might be more or less symbolic,
but could potentially lead to exaggerated counter-reactions, even revolt. How does a
control-freakish state then ﬁnd the right approach to social institutions? Importantly,
Romano observes that ‘the laws of the state would do well to take them into considera-
tion’ (p. 37). His Chapter 2 pertinently discusses a range of practical issues. The onus is
now prominently on the state, but the state is never the only legal actor. Beyond that,
The Legal Order seems neither speciﬁcally interested in various kinds of conﬂicts, nor
their resolution. Though unaware of Romano’s inputs, a forthcoming edited volume of
essays (Kyriaki, 2018) focuses on conﬂict management in scenarios of hybrid social
normativities and will thus ﬁll a gap in Romano’s work.
2I explicitly thank here Professor Matthias Rohe, who ﬁrst alerted me to this issue, insisting that post-War Germans were
simply good positivists, having learnt from history.
3I thank in this regard especially Silvia Bagni, Pierluigi Consorti, Roberto Scarciglia, Federica Sona, Roberto Toniatti,
Marco Ventura and above all Domenico Amirante, whose insights are discussed further below.
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This, too, conﬁrms that Romano’s limited ambition was simply to demonstrate that a
variety of ‘institutions’, including international law, qualify as ‘law’, itself an audacious
project for a state-centric positivist. Notably, careful reading of Romano’s partly
polemical responses to his various critics conﬁrms his sense of frustration and con-
siderable irritation about objections to his stance (p. 49). In Indian contexts, one ﬁnds
the popular image of a blind man describing an elephant. The blind or myopic analyst,
touching only one part of the whole body, cannot really be blamed for partial analysis.
But Italian and other European legal scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century were not blind. They were simply blinded by legal positivism and mesmerized
by its superiority claims. So I sympathize with Romano and share his frustrations about
scholarly petulance (Menski, 2006).
It was probably too early for Romano to claim postmodern methodological insights.
His anguished wording discloses irritation that whatever one describes through certain
words may still not capture all dimensions of the entity examined, and may be
misunderstood. This approximates anxieties over a postmodern gaze that still risks
unwittingly privileging some dominant perspective. I shall return to this below, related
to current fears of revivalism. Romano’s repeated response to critical observations
about holes in his argument is, notably, a promise of more future studies.
Contested practical implications
Reading this book conﬁrmed my conviction that it remains pointless to press the
phenomenon of law into any speciﬁc form of words to achieve a better understanding
of the whole concept. If it is so evident that plurality is ubiquitous also with regard to
law, then why is legal pluralism still a dirty word or a kind of plague for so many
academic lawyers? It remains less fruitful to ask what law is, while reﬂecting what kind
of law one may ﬁnd or imagine in any particular context seems more productive.
Romano argued that what people do in interaction with each other becomes thereby an
‘institution’, resulting in something legal. That this is not unusual transpires from
Croce’s brilliant Afterword, including examples from Sally Falk Moore’s well-known
anthropological approaches.
Romano insisted that various social ‘institutions’ he perceived are already a form of
law. They do not merely become law when a state, in whatever form, recognizes them.
This ﬁne distinction concerns the boundary between what Chiba (1986) helpfully
distinguished as ‘oﬃcial law’ and ‘unoﬃcial law’, insisting that these always coexist in
contested interaction. There was never, as Moore had identiﬁed earlier, too, total
domination by oﬃcial law. Romano said basically the same. One may phrase such
realizations and resulting forms of recognition in terms of Allott’s (1980) limits of law,
or problematize terminological conﬂicts over hybrid normativities (Kyriaki, 2018). The
point is simply, for me today as much as for Romano long ago, that both these two
diﬀerent forms of law are part of the same internally plural legal order, operating at
various levels. This could then, as I call it now, be characterized as a potentially messy
law-related ‘plurality of pluralities’ (POP).
Signiﬁcantly, Romano accepted social agency as a legitimate form of law, but was
avidly opposed to suggestions that individuals could make their own law. Individual
action did not, in his understanding, result in an institution. Yet in a slightly diﬀerent
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context, Romano admits that ‘an isolated human being in the state of nature is purely
metaphysical and a-historical’ (p. 28). I thus reject Romano’s dismissal of individuals as
legal agents, given that one often sees speciﬁc individuals acting behind the smokesc-
reen of various ‘institutions’. This could be more dangerous than we realize. US
President Trump is only the most prominent present example.
Romano was, as noted, also unwilling to address, for his speciﬁc project, the connec-
tions of his ‘institution’ with natural law, morality and ethics. Taking this rigid stance, he
perhaps asserted his position as a positivist, declining to explore natural law as another
form of law. I identiﬁed this above as problematic, but it could be merely a strategic device
to retain analytical focus for The Legal Order. From a Eurocentric modernist perspective,
too, it makes sense. However, as a result, Romano’s explicitly secular theorizing, another
manifestation of his Eurocentrism, prevents his institutional theory from being directly
applicable globally. Assuming that Romano is concerned mainly about the balance
between political and social agency in relation to ‘institutions’ because he lived and
worked in Italy and in an age where the nation-state, as Loughlin’s introduction con-
cludes, had become ‘the primary form of institutional world-building’ (p. xxix), one could
endorse this as a matter of fact. However, being the primary form is not the same as being
in sole control, or owning the only possible form of legal authority!
Romano seems deeply concerned to understand how a modern state-centric struc-
ture may function appropriately. His main argument appears to be that a good state
system, in other words, a good institution of public law and administrative law, must
account for the constant presence of its own social other, various manifestations of
institutions generated by people as interlinked individuals. While he readily accepts
international law as law, as noted, Romano rejects suggestions that a single individual
could form or claim to be an institution. That label, according to him, is only available
as a result of the interaction, in whatever form, of various social actors. In this context,
he distinguishes ‘relationship’ from ‘institution’ (p. 34), highlighting another crucial, yet
fuzzy boundary. How does one determine the precise nature of relations between a
married couple, for example, regarding their most intimate and private understandings
of rights and duties to each other on a day-to-day basis? Evidently, state legal systems
have created formal institutions of marriage, putting relevant Hartian primary rules
into statutory form that now demands compliance. Yet, can one presume that all
nuances of this interpersonal relationship can be regulated, to the last dot, by state
institutions? Here, Romano risks self-contradiction.
The next question would then immediately be to what extent any other form of less
formal social ‘institution’ would or should be recognized, or entitled to recognition by
state institutions. Here, I spot a huge silence in the entire book. Surely, in today’s
democratically structured state orders, state-dominated institutions must be sensitive to,
perhaps even account for, various socially driven institutions to retain viable links of
trust and mutual support between those who govern and those who now hold the right
to vote? An evident risk following failure to cultivate this symbiotic relationship, which
itself assumes the nature of a hybrid institution, means that common people, as voters,
could deny coveted political legitimacy and thus power, to those in charge of state
institutions. Interdisciplinary work on South Asia has recently brought out this impor-
tant realization (Kumar, 2017), an aspect overlooked by Romano, probably because
voters’ right 100 years ago were not so strong.
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Actually, one does not need to go to South Asia for such evidence. Brilliantly
instructive examples of how current Italian law handles pluralist challenges exist.
Immensely powerful, just visually, is a book comprising almost entirely of pictures
(Degiorgis, 2014). The author, a photographer, conveys an obvious legal message,
directly pertinent to Romano’s theorizing. He illustrates how Italian state law operates
sophisticated processes and institutions to manage the substantial presence of huge
Muslim communities in Northern Italy through deliberate silence. While state institu-
tions appear reluctant to grant public recognition and oﬃcial status to Muslim places of
worship, this forces perfectly legal citizens as practising believers to gather quietly
behind certain walls that look from the outside like warehouses, shopfronts or garages.
As long as these Muslim communities do not make aggressive claims to oﬃcial
recognition, such places of worship, manifestly institutions or associations, as
Romano would call this, are tolerated, in the shadow of the law (p. 59).4 In German
law, a ﬁtting technical term for ‘toleration’, Duldung, exists as an institutional form of
acknowledging the physical presence, for example, of asylum seekers in some sort of
legal limbo, within the nation’s territory, yet without granting full legal status.
Other examples could be found of such skilful balancing of coexisting manifestations
of institutions. The large presence of South Asians in Italy, some now reportedly
moving to Britain after spending many years in Bella Italia, points to creative
Eurozone spaces for rebalancing potential conﬂicts between institutions of the state
and social entities. Europe’s Somalis, evidently in their thousands, have been doing the
same. Skilful patterns of mutual toleration have long been known to exist also in the UK
(Ballard, 1994). My own writing on British Muslim law, without the beneﬁt of
Romano’s theorizing, went as far as identifying British Muslim law (angrezi shariat)
as an institution of multicultural Britain (Pearl and Menski, 1998), to the dismay of
many positivists. This hybrid form of Muslim law, constructed by British Muslims,
deeply upsets proponents of ‘one law for all’. Current British debates about ‘parallel
societies’, regulation of Shariat Councils, and new forms of policing registration of
marriages reﬂect exactly such ongoing confused jurisprudential struggles in English law,
especially in the current BREXIT-infected climate. Notably, despite raging debates
about values and ‘religion’, English courts have at times, rather meekly and quietly,
agreed to accept that certain ethnic minority institutions are entitled to explicit legal
recognition by English law.5 Romano’s theory, albeit in contested practice, is thus
amply veriﬁed all over Europe.
Ethical dimensions and impacts for global legal theory
The undeniable presence of such cases raises important questions about practical
implications of plural manifestation of ‘law’ for human progress, development and
4The richly documented ethnographic work of another emerging Italian socio-legal scholar, Federica Sona, has many
such examples.
5As an expert before courts, I am aware of many highly instructive cases of this kind, which tend to remain unreported,
as publicity would show how easily, as one might say in idiomatic English, the law looks like an ass. The remarkable
face-saving exercise by the Court of Appeal, in Chief Adjudication Oﬃcer v. Kirpal Kaur Bath [2000] 1 FLR 8 CA, clearly
avoided blatant injustice to a Sikh widow, by applying a presumption of marriage, unwittingly verifying Romano’s
stance that social arrangements are a reasonable and legitimate form of law. Unfortunately, this strategy is not
followed in many other ‘hard’ cases in Britain, which never gain publicity.
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protection of basic rights. Here, whether something is law or not should be less
important than whether it is good or bad law. Given multiple abuses, also in highly
developed legal systems, much alert scrutiny of the legitimacy of state actions and
institutions is unfortunately still required, engaging what Upendra Baxi has called
‘demosprudence’, a sub-category of human rights argumentation, acknowledging that
it is too simple to blame ‘religion’ and ‘tradition’, and to glorify state law and human
rights. While space constraints do not permit elaboration here, my argument is that for
global considerations of justice and protection of basic rights, Romano’s pluralization of
institutions is not robust enough. There will never be complete agreement on diﬀuse
value judgements involved in scrutinizing various institutions as basic building blocks
of law. The result, as I know from legal practice in England, continue to be terrible
miscarriages of justice in individual cases that simply vanish in ﬁles. As already shown,
Romano simply did not address this thorny issue.
However, such ethical or moral concerns need to be raised here, as this relates
centrally to dominant perceptions of the nature of the state. To positivists, these may
appear clear-cut and global, but they are ethically plural and intensely situation-speciﬁc.
We know that plurality is simply a fact of life, in relation to both law and religion. It is
also a fact that all humans, as humans, should theoretically, or even in some express
form, be deemed to be equal. States, as legal institutions, through formulating funda-
mental rights principles in Constitutions, can simply decree equality and promise
guarantees of fundamental rights protection. International norms, known today in
abundance, seek to reinforce such commitments. But all of this does not make equality
and complete justice a lived reality, as not only Indian law conﬁrms on a daily basis.
Asking for or constructing perfect laws is never enough and constant eﬀorts are needed
to safeguard and implement better justice and equality (Sen, 2009). In that context,
avoiding morality and ethics, rather than including the two competing major value-
based forms of law, namely traditional natural laws and ‘new’ natural laws such as
human rights principles, is plainly myopic. Romano’s work, as noted, risks being
misread, for social norms as well as ethics must be accounted for on conversations
designed to resolve conﬂicts (Kyriaki, 2018).
There is simply no space here to consider related major legal management problems
that humanity is left with, namely what to do with all other forms of living entities and
creations, in short animal rights (see now Rankin, 2018), and also climate change
debates (Saryal, 2018), given the urgent need to aim for holistic global sustainability.
Where and how should states as primary legal agents make distinctions or exceptions
and draw reasonable lines within the pluralist ﬁelds of such battles? The current
troubles that Hindu nationalist India faces with cow slaughter issues and beef con-
sumption are only one dramatic, major manifestation of turbulences in this respect.
Since, contrary to many ‘fake’ news, beef is also consumed by many Hindus, and not
just Muslims, Christians and tribals, the institution of beef consumption, applying
Romano’s argument, should qualify for legal recognition by the Indian state. One
quickly realizes, thus, how brutally contentious such argumentations can become in
the deeply plural Indian state, which claims publicly to uphold ‘Hindu values’, assuming
that this is what the majoritarian electorate wants to hear.
Signiﬁcantly, recent Italian research on the Indian state as a sui generis case
(Amirante, 2015) shows that perceptive Italian legal academics continue to make
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important contributions to global debates about the nature of law. Given the predica-
ments of massive states like India that simply cannot follow European blueprints, new
solutions have to be found. The respective institutions involved in India are very
diﬀerent, as 1.3 billion people are involved, and their diverse values and ethics appear
much more powerful than Western, presumably secular, models suggest. In such
precarious scenarios, concerns about the risks of a ‘revival’ of some theocratic monster,
or simply ‘tradition’, seem overplayed, evidently for demagogic reasons. The wisdom of
Romano to respect ‘institutions’ would appear to help also in such deeply contested
contexts to shape a better world in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
The ease with which questions about the extent of human connectedness to each
other and to Nature (or whatever one may call it) are being brushed aside by the
intellectual domination of modernity and state-centricity remains amazing to me.
Notably, its self-interested and therefore precariously dangerous leitmotif, that the
state and its agents, as sole makers and regulators of law, link directly to isolated
individuals as citizens, is rightly picked up by Romano as highly dubious (p. 28). While
nobody would dispute that today, also in India, the state is of major importance, one
could reasonably demand, following Romano’s theorizing, that a reasonable state
should accept people’s institutions as legitimate legal stakeholders. But the postmodern
state of the Global South also faces expectations to be a somewhat selﬂess power, not
oriented only towards formal state law structures and state control, but preservation of
a larger holistic system, even an Order akin to ancient models. This is not about
dreaming of a glorious past, it is a hopeful gaze into a safer future. Ruling can be
perceived as an act of public service, rather than a self-righteously claimed right of
certain privileged or simply power-hungry people.
As noted, in the more plurality-conscious Global South remarkably strong personal
laws as institutions are included in the taxonomy of law, obviously recognizing groups
of individuals as legal actors. A reasonable postmodern state may go much further,
however, relying also on certain culture-speciﬁc ethical notions of a larger Order,
whether indigenous or not, to call its own citizens to order, individually and collec-
tively. Indian law today shows that without speaking about dharma, it is possible to
include provisions on fundamental duties, found in Article 51-A of the Indian
Constitution of 1950, as amended in 1976. A state may then demand people’s adherence
to such duties, rather than insisting on the language of fundamental rights. Co-opting
citizens in this manner, educating them to become a responsible ‘institution’, gives away
how the massive states of the Global South today envisage implementing social welfare.
The realization that state law actually needs society, and can legitimately rely on its
ethical foundations and social and economic support mechanisms, to operate a good
law is gradually growing. While the global North largely presumes that maintenance of
human rights is its hallmark and new Grundnorm, various nations of the Global South
are found to incorporate institutions that also concern the environment, and hence
Nature and its ethical values, as well as people’s contributions and expectations, into
holistic equations and expectations of sustainable development. This happens, appar-
ently, to maintain culture-speciﬁc visions of Order/order in which states, or rather
certain ruler ﬁgures, seem to be perceiving themselves, at least partly, as support
mechanisms of a higher Order, rather than the ultimate legal authority. The state
here simply has a diﬀerent kind of vision, of course often heavily contested. Unless
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one appreciates the basics of the various ethical traditions of the Global South and their
relations to governance, one will fail to spot this.
So, while the nation-state is today visibly a dominant entity, Loughlin’s ﬁnal advice,
that ‘we might more sensibly follow Romano and examine carefully the empirical
evidence’ (p. xxix, n. 63), sounds good. But I know from bitter experience how terribly
diﬃcult it is to assess any empirical evidence from India, as much is rhetorically
morphed, rather than plainly presented cultural, social or even legal fact. Hence, we
are currently often not even beginning to understand what games the Indian state is
playing to balance its ferociously dancing kite of law, tormented by massive pluralities
that no European state has ever had to face (see Menski, 2016b). Before we sit in
judgement over whatever nationalist strategies one may perceive in obnoxious opera-
tion, it would be advisable to reﬂect on what academic ancestors like Romano taught us
about the need for plurality-consciousness in law. Incorporating the social sphere, as
Romano so clearly advised, is one crucial element. Respecting various ethical elements
attached to these laws is evidently quite another, and even if Romano did not include
these components, we need to remember that he did not dismiss them as irrelevant.
Conclusions
When administrative lawyers engage in legal theorizing, it is almost inevitable that
they privilege formal rules, positive/public law, the state and its various processes of
decision-making. Such lawyers, not trained as anthropologists or philosophers of law,
will then struggle to appreciate the ethics of various legal traditions. Close study of
Romano’s work facilitates the transcending of such disciplinary boundaries and
mental blocks, fertilizing global legal scholarship. Even though Romano’s book
basically addressed only one narrow aspect, the concept of ‘institution’, bridging
the gap between state law and non-state law, it contributes in my view enormously
to ethically responsible, pluralist theorizing. I hope to have shown that Romano, too,
actually appreciated the various ethical and psychological dimensions within the
wide ﬁeld of law. He did not debate this at length, being simply pragmatic, writing
a short book. His study and the present discussion conﬁrm, in my submission, that
global legal scholarship, supported by philosophers, historians, anthropologists/
sociologists and also natural lawyers, who contrary to some myths have not died
out also in the Global North, cannot aﬀord the luxury of focusing only on positive
law and social institutions, ignoring the rest. Romano in English translation, if read
carefully, constitutes an important source of lifeblood to inspire new vigour in global
plural legal theorizing.
I suggested recently (Menski, 2016a) that a major globally present logical and
rational foundation for attempts to generate identiﬁable legal orders may be a lurking
latent fear of chaos. This goes much deeper than positivist aversion to legal uncertainty.
It may not even be clearly expressed in many cultures. Notably, quite graphic images of
this chaos scenario exist in ancient Indic terror visions, using the image of ‘shark-rule’.
When administrative lawyers become sharks, as we know, we are all doomed, and the
state is likely to fail. While the self-serving claim of administrative lawyers and other
guardians of legal order, all over the world, remains that they are the state’s legitimate
army of protectors of avoidance of chaos, hence also entitled to good pay and
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veneration by the public, Romano’s theorizing, I believe, somehow sought to challenge
that myth, too. Mussolini evidently did not notice this. Giving voice and agency to ‘the
people’, even in a pre-democratic age, Romano also anticipated, at least in my reading,
the growing current realization that understanding the nature of law and applying it
properly remains, everywhere, a highly plural balancing act, almost a sacred duty. That
such an intelligent man then remained in such a high oﬃce in Fascist times intrigues
me, raising yet more questions about his biography.
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